Throughout the last year, the Russian and international public lively discussed the project envisaging the construction of the Northern-European Gas Pipeline (NEGP).
The debates began to acquire especially acute form, when the participants of the project – the Russian "Gazprom" and German concerns concluded the respective agreement and the project entered the stage of practical implementation.

There were voiced absolutely polar points of view, from most well-disposed ones: "this project is of historical importance for Germany that will be granted reliable power supply for decades ahead" (Gerhard Schroeder, the Chancellor of Germany) and "the Russian-German Project of the Northern-European Gas Pipeline (NEGP) across the Baltic Sea floor is going to become an environmentally safe way of power supply" (Benita Ferrero-Waldner, Member of the European Commission (EC) for Foreign Relations and European Neighborhood Policy) to the most strong and negative remarks, like "the pact signed by Putin and Schroeder is bad from the environmental and poor from the economic and political points of view" (President of Poland Alexander Kwasniewski), "[it] threatens the security and independence of Poland" (a resolution of the Polish Sejm), and "[it] will become an ecological catastrophe" (Algirdas Brazauskas, the Prime-Minister of Lithuania).
Indeed, it can not be denied that this project per se is a rather expensive and complex enterprise both in technical and political terms.
The technical complexity of the project is determined primarily by the fact that at present, according to a number of ecologists, the seafloor of the Baltic Sea is littered with deathly German chemical ammunitions sunken by the anti-Hitler coalition allies after the World War II (303 thousand metric tons in total). Some of these ammunitions containing mustard gas, lewisite, phosgene, nerve gas, and other deathly poisons are laying on the seafloor of the Gulf of Finland, where the gas pipeline will run. At the same time, according to a statement made by Alexei Yablochkov, a famous Russian ecologist, there are no maps showing the exact locations of such underwater dumps. This circumstance creates a threat of a serious ecological catastrophe, which may occur in the case the sunken ammunitions are harmed during construction works, and will have an extremely negative impact on the ecosystem of the whole region.
On the other hand, the project has triggered a number of political issues. The main problem is that natural gas will be supplied from Russia to Western European countries by a direct route bypassing transit countries. It is a well-known fact that as an option alternative to the Northern-European Gas Pipeline there had been considered ground routes going through the territories of Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Poland. It would have made construction much cheaper; however, it would have hardly lessened the maintenance costs, since the calculation of the final price of fuel should also take into account the amount of transit payments. Finding themselves outside of this project, the Baltic States and Poland characterize the decision to lay the gas pipeline across the floor of the Baltic Sea (and not through their territories) as politically motivated and erroneous.
A certain political poignancy of the discussion around the NEGP issue was also caused by the fact that with respect to this matter the new members of the European Union had engaged in controversy against the EU old-timers (first of all, Germany) and Brussels itself stating that the construction of the gas pipeline without taking into account their interests undermined the principles of the EU common energy policy.
The third political consequence of the project was the appointment of Gerhard Schroeder, the former Chancellor of Germany, as the head of the gas pipeline construction. It is well-known that he had actively supported the project, and now many German politicians accuse him of drawing personal gains from the decisions he had taken as the head of the state. However, a number of experts hail this appointment pointing out that it was necessary to use Schroeder’s political "weight" to promote the project more successfully, especially as concerns the relations with the countries voicing their negative attitude to the NEGP.
Indeed, it would be hardly possible to think that such a large-scale project could satisfy all interested parties and thus avoid an active international discussion. However, let us try to puzzle out what are the usefulness and significance of this project for the Russian-European relations at large and the Kaliningrad oblast in particular, and what risks the construction of this gas pipeline may involve. Let us try to distinguish facts and speculations.
First, the international importance of this project is that it will permit to significantly enhance the capacity to supply the "blue fuel" to the member-countries of the European Union, what acquires special importance taking into account the fact that the volumes of consumption of natural gas in these countries have been steadily growing. Second, the project will contribute to the increasing degree of reliability of gas supplies to the EU member-countries and their energy safety because of the diversification of energy sources. Third, it will permit to lessen the risks of interruptions in deliveries resulting from possible shifts in the political situation. And, finally, due to the fact that no transit states are involved in supplies carried out via the NEPG, there arises the possibility to reduce the costs of transportation of the Russian natural gas. No doubt, it is an important advantage both for the supplier of natural gas and its end-consumers.
The NEPG project will directly connect the Russia’s unified system of gas supply to the common European gas network and will become a significant contribution to the creation of the common Russian-European space as concerns energy issues. Moreover, as it was stressed at the meeting of Mikhail Fradkov, the RF Prime-Minister, with Michael Glos, the German Minister of Economy, which took place at the inauguration ceremony of the NEGP, the project should give an additional impetus to the interaction between Russian and the European Union in the framework of the "roadmap" of formation of the common economic space. Therefore, the all-European importance of the new gas pipeline as one of the "bridges" connecting Russia and the European Union in practical terms and increasing the degree of their mutual integration can not be open to question.
The project also plays a special role on the all-Russian scale, since in the NEGP framework it is planned to build a spur to Kaliningrad, what should permit to increase the gas supplies to the oblast, as well as ensure the absence of natural gas shortages, reliability and diversification of the sources of natural gas supplies, and avoid political risks associated with the transit of gas across the territories of third countries. In this connection, experts express the opinion that the NEGP construction will facilitate the enhanced predictability and stability of economic operations conducted by industrial enterprises of the region and will give a powerful impetus to the economic development of the Kaliningrad oblast.
As concerns the criticisms addressed to the project, these critical remarks are based on the fact that all countries situated in the region of the Baltic Sea, including Russia and Germany, bear the common responsibility to each other for its preservation and the state of its ecology. Therefore, the project should exclude any threat of pollution of the Baltic Sea, since in the case it is polluted, the countries, not participating in the project, will be also affected. Proceeding from this fact, the opponents of the NEGP insist on the guarantees of ecological safety of the project. However, here it should be noted that the developers of the project, who clearly understand their responsibility, themselves raise this issue as a priority. According to a "Gazprom" statement, "the construction of NEGP will be conducted meeting the most strict ecological standards and will not damage the ecosystem of the Baltic Sea."
Involuntary it comes to mind the comparison with the similar recent situation concerning the construction of the D-6 oil platform on the Baltic Sea shelf by the Russian "LUKOIL" company. This project had been also sharply criticized by ecologists. According to a number of experts, in this case the hysteria about the ecological risks was nothing more than a secret tool used to attain not ecological, but economic and political objectives. As time has shown, the existing engineering solutions permit to implement projects of any technical complexity in the open sea without detriment to the environment, what proves that ecological risks are often exaggerated in the course of evaluation of such initiatives. Moreover, it should be noted that ecological concerns belong to technical aspects of implementation of projects and should primarily draw attention of experts in ecology and not politicians.
A substantial point supporting the groundlessness of statements that the decision to lay the gas pipeline across the Baltic Sea floor along a route bypassing the Baltic States and Poland had been politically motivated was voiced by Javier Solana, the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Secretary-General of the Council of the European Union, who said that "in the end, the construction of a new pipeline is a business decision. It would be far too expensive a project to be undertaken for political purposes."
In conclusion, I would like to quote Andris Piebalgs, a representative of Latvia, the EU Commissioner for Energy. His point of view looks very balanced; besides, he can be hardly accused of expressing a biased judgment, since Latvia, as it is well known, was a most bitter opponent of the NEGP construction. In particular, Mr. Piebalgs said: "No doubt, investors decide, where the project should be implemented. In 2003, there was taken the decision that supplies of natural gas from Russia to the European Union were a priority… [from three possible routes] the only option, in which investors took interest, was the route across the Baltic Sea floor. In my opinion, it does not pose any problems as concerns the reliability of gas supplies to Latvia, since in the case the need arises, there may be built a spur. Besides, for the EU at large, where this market is formed, it would be more favorable if a new way of gas supplies appeared. And the better the common European market is supplied, the better it is for Latvia, because it provides it with more opportunities."
The example of the NEPG construction graphically illustrates the complexity of the Russian-European relations: conflicts of interests take place not only between Russian and the EU, but inside the European Union as well, among its member-states. However, in this case the placing of stake on cooperation with the EU "old-timers," its economic and political "heavyweights" is an absolutely justified decision, which seems to be the most promising as concerns the development of the new quality of the Russian-European partnership.

Reference note on the project
The Northern-European Gas Pipeline (NEGP) is a brand new route to export Russian gas to Europe. The target markets of the NEGP supplies are Germany, Great Britain, the Netherlands, France, and Denmark. By a decision of the European Commission, the project was awarded the “TEN” status (Trans-European Networks).
The length of the gas pipeline offshore section (from Vyborg to Greifswald) will make 1,198 km. The first leg of the Northern-European Gas Pipeline will be commissioned in 2010. Its annual capacity should make about 27.5 billion cubic meters. It is envisaged that there will be built the second leg of the gas pipeline, what will increase the NEGP capacity two times up to 55 billion cubic meters a year (by 2013). The estimated cost of works related to the laying of the gas pipeline should make Euro 4 billion.
The first joint of the NEGP was welded in the Vologda oblast (the town of Babyevo) on December 9, 2005.