ON THE THRESHOLD OF CHANGES
Russia and the European Union have negotiated a legislative and institutional basis of their future relations, which was inevitable because of the expiration of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) in the autumn, 2007. The Parties have approached this discussion with the sense of mutual tiredness of each other, if not to say, with the sense of mutual irritation. In fact, the policy of “peaceful coexistence” has prevailed by February, 2004, when it became obvious that the socio-political and economic models of both Parties differ form each other more and more. The subject of rapprochement is now used only as an excuse to achieve one or another economic concession not related to long-term objectives. In practice tough competition on specific economic issues is sometimes hidden behind the "strategic partnership" slogan. The agenda for bilateral summits and the substantial part of the accepted agreements are being constricted. Both Russia and the European Union have displayed their inability to formulate common goals and objectives, and to define common values and often even their practical interests.
The lack of former enthusiasm on both sides pushes toward “pragmatic and materially-minded” decisions such as “obligation - fulfillment” (or, rather, nonfulfillment). The public and political atmosphere, which is as cheerless as the texts of the Russia-EU joint Road maps accepted in May, 2005, is not beneficial for the search for new decisions. Breaking ideas for the future can become unclaimed as a result of adherence to pragmatism.
At the same time, Russia and the European Union are already so close, and the real content of their relations is so significant that a new level of confidence is needed. But it can’t be enabled by practices and institutions formed in the early 1990s when the situation was completely different. After all, today there are questions on the agenda that were just impossible to put 10 – 15 years ago.
Russia and the European Union –two inseparable parts of the Old World which is losing its global influence – have to become intellectually free from the fetters of their mutually accumulated legal and institutional base. Though it keeps their relations from obvious degradation, it puts obstacles in the way of progress. It will be possible to formulate a long-term model of relations, only if Moscow and European capitals go beyond the scope of patterns about which all debates are held, and recognize the possibility of different and also non-standard variants. Integration development in the spheres where it is really possible and essential, will faster lead to market opening and free movement of persons, goods, services and capital than the hasty inclusion of new sectors and directions of the “harmonization” into bureaucratic program, or than proclamation of such different subjects as common goals shared by the alliance.
The historical split of Europe will not be overcome unless Russia and the EU form an alliance oriented to the future. The European Union which is weakening, especially geostrategically, has entered a long period of internal transformation; objectively, it needs Russia both economically and politically (to promote its interests in the international arena), though it is not ready to admit this officially. Russia which is involved in a complicated geostrategic environment and is losing its positions in the whole set of parameters; will also need the European Union in a medium-term perspective.
The relative sustainability of the Russian executive system, which is population supported, together with the favourable conditions on the world energy market, give Moscow an opportunity to more actively promote its own vision of strategic goals and forms of cooperation, as well as means to guarantee equal rights for partners. Russia shouldn’t be considered de facto as a “younger partner” of the EU. A gradual deviation from the currently accepted point of view is needed. According to this viewpoint the progress is linked with the adoption by external partners of “light” version of EU laws and and standards (acquis communautaire).
The elaboration of a new agreement will test the “great energy power’s” ability to take independent foreign-policy strategic decisions and to secure their realization. And Russia will have to do all this in cooperation with such an experienced partner as the European Commission.
AFTER 2007: THREE VARIANTS
From the legal point of view, “Problem 2007” doesn’t exist in Russia-EU relations. According to Article 106 of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, “the Agreement shall be automatically renewed year by year provided that neither Party gives the other Party written notice of denunciation of the Agreement at least six months before it expires”. However the question of elaboration of a new agreement is already on the agenda. Currently three versions of political and legal foundations of bilateral relations after 2007 can be considered.
The first variant: annual automatic renewal of the PCA, as it is stipulated by Article 106. The main emphasis is placed on filling the joint Road maps on Four Common Spaces with specific content. Some of the PCA provisions remain, while others may become invalid as time passes. The PCA is gradually dying out, still not having an adequate replacement of the same level and authority.
The second variant: to add alterations and additions, which would provide for an updated basis for institutional cooperation for the next 10-15 years. For example, , it may acquire one of the existing formats of relations between the EU and the states located along its periphery, as well as former European powers’ colonies in Africa (an association, a free trade area, etc).
The third variant: to adopt a new political and legal document (a set of documents), which will completely replace the PCA and will be ratified by Russia, the European Union and its member-states, if necessary. At the same time, not the general political document (Declaration) might need to be ratified, but only single agreements on specific issues (sectoral agreements).
The easiest way, for sure, is to prolong the term of the Agreement and add to it new articles, reflecting everything which has been elaborated lately, especially the Energy Dialogue and the Road Maps on Four Common Spaces. Brussels prefers this scenario. It will give the European Commission an opportunity to preserve the role of leader in relations with Russia and will reduce the influence of individual EU member-states which are more interested in the development of cooperation with Moscow than others. The following development of the events is also beneficial for the major part of the EU political elite, because it relieves the Union of necessity to elaborate a clear strategy for relations with Russia and gives an opportunity to focus attention on efforts to overcome its own system crisis.
This variant may seem to be winning for Moscow because it solves the question of forming a strong and cooperative negotiation team for drafting, together with the European Union, a new basic document (a set of documents). It is extremely difficult to create an efficient “mass of manoeuvre” under conditions of heavy shortage of skilled experts, together with interdepartmental dissociation.
However, if Russia agrees to prolong/renew the PCA, or replace it by another document taken from the foreign-policy nomenclature of the European Commission and reflecting its terminology, it will voluntary admit its status as “younger partner”, a subject for inspection and instruction. The arm-twisting technique frequently used by the European Union in economic issues such as, for example, compensating payments for usage of Russian routs by European airlines, would become a regular practice.
On the whole, the format of political and legal relations doesn’t considerably influence the development of real integration in those spheres, in which both Parties are interested. Many countries which have closer and more efficient relations with the EU than Russia are not interested in registering their liabilities legally, by ratifying them in parliament and making them, in fact, a part of national law. Thus, the United States, which has a visa-free regime and a huge trade turnover with the European Union, is satisfied with just a general political declaration accompanied by a set of bilateral agreements and obligatory working plans on specific issues.
TO STAKE ON EQUALITY
It is necessary to revise accepted nowadays approaches, while elaborating a new political and legal format of relations between Russia and the European Union.
First of all, the unique Russia’s function in Europe and in the whole world has to be reflected in the future model of relations. That means that the new document (set of documents) can not be in the same “system of co-ordinates” as the existing EU’s practice of legalizating relations with neighboring countries. It is suggested not to regard as initial well-known formats and titles of the European Union agreements with other countries, such as Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, Association Agreement, Europe Agreements, etc.
Secondly, the new agreement can not be an “instruction” how to bring Russia closer to the existing and constantly changing regulations of the European Union concerning political and economic life. In practice, it usually ends up by substitution of bilateral documents by approved versions of the EU’s internal documents which reflect its vision of what the Russian Federation should do. Generally, it is necessary to avoid being “looped” on the idea of “harmonization of legislation” as a universal tool for development of trade, economic and humanitarian relations. There is no sense for Russia to adopt the European Union legislation without putting a question about its membership.
Both Parties should be guided by international law, WTO regulations, etc. And this does not exclude Russia’s adoption of individual legal regulations, in those cases when it is not connected with concession on state sovereignty. In addition, if the Parties show their willingness to establish supragovernmental forms of cooperation in one or another direction in the future, then it will be possible to elaborate new legal regulations in this sphere.
Thirdly, in the new document one should avoid evaluative judgments about Russian economy and society as a whole. The statement that the European Union considers Russia to be a “developed democratic country with foundations of market economy” deliberately places the EU on the higher level, thus undermining the principle of equality.
Instead, it is worth to consider elaboration of a document which declares the forming of a strategic alliance between Russia and the European Union as a new element of regional and international security. It is necessary for that to denote clearly a common vision of key issues concerning international life. However, the positions of Russian and the European Union are close to each other, in spite of their tactical differences on the majority of urgent issues, such as the role of the United Nations and other international institutions, the supremacy of international law, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, counterterrorism, cross-border crime and drug-trafficking, stabilization of the situation on the Great Middle East, environmental protection, etc. Thereupon, the Parties should strengthen the priority of common strategic interests over individual disagreements or phobias inherited from the past.
A new joint document could contain indications of universally accepted principles (such as the observance of human rights, freedom and equality of international trade and the arrangement of the political process in accordance with the existing regulations), which Russia and the EU follow on the international arena and in bilateral relations. The Parties should clearly state that they are going to establish their economic relations on the basis of, and taking into account, the Russian legislation adaptation to the policy and regulations of the WTO, which the Russian Federation is going to join shortly. If economic interests require closer integration in one or another sphere, the corresponding harmonization of legislation in this particular sphere will be legalized by a separate agreement.
One of the long-term tools for forming political, economic and geopolitical community of Russia and Europe alliance is selective integration in those spheres of economy where it can yield real value added cost for both Parties. For example, the parties may consider the possibility of establishing such associations as a supranational Russian-European Oil and Gas Association, a Russian-European Transport and Space Association, a Russian-European Environmental Community. In those spheres where the Parties can not reach the level of integration, they will retain their full sovereignty and cooperation.
THREE LEVELS OF RELATIONS
It is possible to make the above principles a reality on the basis of a three-level system of political and legal relations between Russia and the European Union. It will give an opportunity to take into account the peculiarities of the two Parties, their interests and international circumstances.
The first level. A Declaration for a Strategic Union Treaty, which performs a function of a comprehensive preamble, would be the major general political document establishing the strategic framework for Russia-EU relations. It proclaims establishing of Strategic for Russia-EU relations as its aim, which is aimed at overcoming hostility and rivalry, as well as psychological consequences of wars and conflicts of the past, establishing truly allied relations supposing deep integration in selected spheres. These relations are not against third countries and are based on a common vision of challenges and security threats, on the interdependence and interoperability between Russia and the European Union in a number of key economic sectors, on their common cultural and scientific heritage, as well as on recognition of the significance of their rapprochement for ensuring sustainable development and security.
It is necessary to mention that common strategic interests of Russia and the European Union have a priority character and to enumerate the international politics spheres where both Parties agree with each other. There should be also a place in the Declaration for other issues vital for both Parties, including devotion to such basic democratic values, as law supremacy, protection of human rights and the rights of minorities, judicial system independence, the division of powers and guaranteeing competitive political environment, mass media independence and free movement of citizens. It is necessary to mention, that Russia and the European Union establish their relations on the basis of quality, mutual benefit and transparency, and that, while operating within the framework of international and regional organizations, they will aim at taking into account each other’s position, at coordination and maximum alignment of their approaches.
A strategic union between Russia and the European Union would have a great value as a connecting-link between regional security systems in Europe, Asia and North America. It is essential to enumerate in the Declaration the directions of foreign policy and military cooperation of Russia and the European Union and joint peacemaking actions opportunities, in order to add systematic character to the relations in the military and political spheres.
The second level: “Strategic agenda – Russia – the European Union”, which specifies specific directions for their cooperation. This is primarily the cooperation in the sphere of international and regional security, including elimination of the 21st century threats and risks – terrorism, environmental problems, poverty, etc. The following section may contain a list and description of joint initiatives for resolving specific questions of international security, military cooperation and peacemaking actions, and also include references to specific provisions of international law rules which underlie joint actions.
Another major direction is cooperation in the international trade and the global economy. It is worthwhile to fully enumerate the intensions of the Parties according to highly detailed list of questions on mutual interest in individual economic sectors and in international trade, which are reflected in the general part of the Declaration.
The third section of the agenda could be concentrated on cooperation in the sphere of free movement of persons and unhampered transit. One should rely on declared intension of the Parties to introduce visa-free regime for movement of citizens through a gradual simplification of the visa regime. It is also worthwhile to mention the necessity to simplify, as much as possible, the scheme of transit through the Kaliningrad region.
The section on cultural and humanitarian cooperation, the major direction of Russian and the European Union rapprochement, is likely to contain a list of the already existing and planned initiatives for the development and strengthening of joint activities. It is worth to mention an intention to intensity and encourage the exchange of students, school teachers, professors, scientists, etc.
Of fundamental importance is a special section on cooperation between businesses and civil societies. The section should contain a list of intensions and ideas how to advance a direct dialogue in the framework of business community and also between nongovernmental organizations. The lack of mechanisms and instruments for protecting business interests is nowadays one of the key problems in Russia - the European Union relations. First of all, Russian entrepreneurs themselves, with rare exception, are not ready to invest seriously in creation of such a lobbying infrastructure. Secondly, the nature of relations between business and government in Russian do not promote the protection the interests of entrepreneurs abroad. The negotiating process between Russia and the European Union remains closed and nontransparent for Russian business community, which leads to neglecting of its interests.
Taking into account the unique role of the European Union in Russia’s foreign trade turnover (which amounts to almost 50 per cent), it is worth to raise the issue of expanding the representation of Russian business interests at European supranational institution level, and also establishing a legal basis for the integration of Russian business into the business community of the United Europe. The Russian Federation and the European Union may even work out a separate agreement to support the representation of their interests. The main idea of the following agreement (sectoral agreement) is to give Russian and the European Union entrepreneurs the formal right to represent and protect their interests on the partner’s territory.
At the same time, business circles should become responsible for coordination of their approaches to issues of economic relations within the framework of special advisory mechanism. Associations, companies and their representatives should be provided with access to governmental information (on the basis of a strictly defined type of documents and at the certain stage of their development). They also should formalize the minimum (before it reaches the decision-making stage) terms of representation of the intergovernmental agreements’ drafts and other documents to Russian and the EU Councils of Entrepreneurs.
The last section of the agenda should concern the questions of its realization, including a provision on the creation of a special mechanism, which will supervise the implementation of the agreed intensions between Russia and the European Union.
Finally, the third level: sectoral agreements of various scales and obligation, which would become the real “engine” and practical tool for Russia and the European Union relations. These agreements should predetermine the functional integration in different spheres of activity to the extent of integration of different market segments. The entire process of European integration was launched by functional approach, which means the achievement of political integration by means of closer cooperation in separate technical spheres. It is meant that it is possible to implement to Russia-EU relations the same practice that underlay the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in the beginning of the 1950s. This is the only successful experience of overcoming contradictions and conflicts between formerly hostile countries. The participation of France and Germany in the ECSC both answered their economic interests and became one of the key factors in their historical reconciliation.
Cooperation on a functional basis makes it possible to minimize discrimination toward any participant of the project. At least the three countries which initiated the ECSC (France, Germany and Italy) have strengthened their political positions with the help of this organization and have become leaders of the new historical process. In addition, the functional approach enables countries to regard more flexible the problem whether to accept these or those norms and values as a mandatory condition for integration. When the Rome Treaties establishing the European Communities were signed in 1957 nobody thought of proclaiming that France would become a member only if it stops military activities in Algeria.
Moreover, the functional integration and direct cooperation of the supranational governments, businesses and social structures of the Parties will make it possible to create the atmosphere of confidence, which is the most important thing, lacking in the relations between Russia and the European Union and, probably, between the member-states.
However, the functional integration can be successful only if implemented rules are equally beneficial for all the participants. The integration which has exclusion one of them from the market as a condition or a consequence is never going to work.
It is possible to single out transport, education, space and, possibly, power engineering, as obvious spheres for cooperation. The sphere of transport, especially air transport, is one of the most suitable spheres to launch a Russian-European integration project. Profits here are minimal. Both in Russian and in the European Union big carrier companies face similar difficulties. The scale of governmental support, which is vital for the industry even in the USA, is about the same everywhere. And the most important point is that the potential Russian and the European Union contribution to the “common stock” may turn to be almost equal. It will put obstacles on the way of establishing seller – buyer relations, which inevitably transform any dialogue into bargaining.
Only sectoral agreements require parliamentary ratification of all the above mentioned agreements of the new political and legal format of Russia-EU relations. It will let the Parties to avoid negative consequences connected with the necessity of lobbying the issue of a Russia-EU strategic union through the legislature authorities of the European Union member-states, which have strained relations with Moscow because of some historical and psychological factors.